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Name	Category	Date	Size
Sub-Chapter 1.1 – Introduction.pdf	Pre-Construction Environmental Report (PCER)	20-06-2023	133.32 KB
Sub-chapter 1.1 describes the overall purpose and scope of the Pre-Construction Environmental Report (PCER), within the scope of the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process. It also describes the structure and layout of the PCER, and provides an outline description of the contents, and a road map of the PCER to the requirements of the EA guidance Process and Information (P&I) Document. Download
Sub-Chapter 21.2 - Management System.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	125.8 KB
Sub-chapter 21.2 outlines the quality programme established for the UK EPR™ generic design assessment (GDA) project, and the management systems of the co-applicants (EDF and AREVA) and main subcontractor (AMEC), including documentation, control, records, design review and change management processes, and audits. Download
Sub-Chapter 21.1 - Project Organisation.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	87.46 KB
Sub-chapter 21.1 outlines the organisation established for the project management of the generic design assessment (GDA) process, and the main organisational arrangements required to control the design and construction of a new plant in accordance with the applicable standards and regulations. Download
Sub-Chapter 20.2 - Decommissioning - Implementation for the EPR™.pdf		20-06-2023	125.87 KB
Sub-chapter 20.2 describes how the principles and regulations discussed in PCSR Sub-chapter 20.1 have been followed at the early UK EPR™ design stage to ensure and facilitate future decommissioning in a safe and environmentally acceptable way. It describes the measures adopted at the EPR™ design stage to minimise the volume of radioactive structures, reduce the toxicity of the waste, lower the activity level of irradiated components, restrict the spread of contamination and permit easier decontamination, facilitate the access of personnel and machines and the removal of waste, and ensure the collection of building and operating data needed to prepare for decommissioning. An estimate of the volumes of low and intermediate level waste is also given, together with a discussion of the disposability thereof. Finally, the baseline decommissioning strategy currently envisaged is presented. Download
Sub-Chapter 20.1 - General Decommissioning Principles – Regulations.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	76.24 KB
Sub-chapter 20.1 provides an overview of the dismantling process which results in the regulatory delicensing of the site, the approach to reduction of risk to the public during dismantling, the documentation required, and outlines the UK EPR™ design principles which ensure that both the radioactive dose received by workers, and the amount of radioactive waste and hazardous material produced are reduced to as low as reasonably practicable. The baseline principles and objectives that should be adopted during decommissioning, to enable adequate management of the decommissioning process and preparation of plans and proposals for decommissioning, are outlined, together with the need for records of information pertinent to decommissioning. Download
Sub-Chapter 19.1 - Plant Commissioning Programme.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	102.34 KB
Sub-chapter 19.1 provides an overview of the objectives, principles and scope of the plant commissioning programme, which is carried out in three main phases. Phases I and II are part of the pre-operational test programme, which includes: the preliminary tests and controls, and the first start-up of equipment and functions, without any interaction between the primary and the secondary-side systems; followed by the cold and hot functional tests of the reactor coolant and secondary-side systems before fuel loading. Phase III of the commissioning programme corresponds to the initial start-up test programme, which includes core loading, cold and hot pre-critical tests and actual start-up, including a demonstration run, up to the start of commercial operation. Download
Sub-Chapter 19.0 - Commissioning Safety Requirements.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	80.76 KB
Sub-chapter 19.0 provides a brief outline of the commissioning safety, programme and organisational requirements, together with the associated regulatory framework. Download
Sub-Chapter 18.3 - Abnormal Operation.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	259.75 KB
Sub-chapter 18.3 describes the operating principles to be applied to the UK EPR™ plant outside of normal operation. Emergency operation and severe accident conditions are defined. The operating principles for both of these conditions are defined, as far as they can influence the plant safety assessment. The emergency operating principles address plant operation following an accident, when operator actions are needed, and are based on a plant State Oriented Approach. Operating principles concerning severe accidents are outlined, covering the scenarios taken into account in the safety analysis (described in Sub chapter 16.2). Additionally the principles that would be applied in developing an Emergency Plan for the UK EPR™ are described. Download
Sub-Chapter 18.2 - Normal Operation.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	652.91 KB
The PCSR contains assumptions and requirements necessary to ensure the results claimed in the overall safety case. Operating documents will need to be defined in order to ensure that the plant is operated consistently with these assumptions and requirements. Sub chapter 18.2 outlines the methods that will provide design limits and conditions for the UK EPR™. It details the arrangements for moving the PCSR to an operating regime which will ensure that the requirements and assumptions contained in the PCSR are captured in operating documents. During normal operation the plant must be operated to manage normal scheduled operating transients and specific operations involving unplanned events, and in a manner consistent with the safety case assumptions. This is achieved using the principles and procedures for normal operation described here, and by establishing operating rules for normal operation. Download
Sub-Chapter 18.1 - Human Factors.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	1.18 MB
Sub-chapter 18.1 describes how Human Factors (HF) principles, methods and standards are integrated into the UK EPR™ design and operating concepts. It explains the objectives and scope of HF integration including the use of operating experience from previous plants to improve the design from a HF viewpoint. It presents a set of safety arguments as to how human performance will contribute to the achievement of nuclear safety and provides evidence to support those arguments. The Human Based Safety Claims that are part of the overall Nuclear Safety demonstration for the plant are identified and the requisite evidence (e.g. task analyses) to support these claims is presented. The requirements of the human machine interface design are described. The assurance process that underlies the achievement of adequate human reliability to support the overall nuclear safety demonstration is described. Download
Sub-Chapter 17.6 - Conclusions of EPR ALARP Assessment.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	71.14 KB
Sub-chapter 17.6 provides the conclusions of the UK EPR™ ALARP assessment, and concludes that the design of the UK EPR™ complies with the overall requirements of the ALARP principle, which is a key safety design objective for the UK EPR™. Download
Sub-Chapter 17.5 - Review of Possible Design Modifications to Confirm Design meets ALARP Principle.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	240.98 KB
UK regulatory guidance on the application of As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) for new civil reactors recommends that there should be a clear conclusion that no further reasonable practicable improvements could be implemented in the reactor design, and that therefore the risk has been reduced to ALARP. Sub-chapter 17.5 provides an ALARP assessment methodology, and an ALARP assessment of several UK EPR™ design alternatives, based on modifications required by international regulators in their assessment of the EPR™, or modifications implemented in the Sizewell B PWR. None of the modifications considered is indicated as reasonably practicable according to the quantitative ALARP assessment methodology. Download
Sub-Chapter 17.4 - Review of PSA Results: Comparison with Numerical Risk Targets.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	141.13 KB
Sub-chapter 17.4 summarises the results of the probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) for the UK EPR™ (presented in Sub-chapter 15.5 of the PCSR), which demonstrates that the risk to the public due to accidents meets the ONR targets for 'Broadly Acceptable' risk. It is confirmed that UK EPR™ safety design objectives for risk (presented in Sub-chapter 3.1 of the PCSR) are achieved, and therefore that the risk from UK EPR™ operation is likely to be in the broadly acceptable region. Download
Sub-Chapter 17.3 - EPR Design Optioneering.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	194.48 KB
Sub-chapter 17.3 describes the optioneering process carried out in France and Germany between 1987 and 2006 to develop the EPR™ design, and the design review carried out by independent safety experts on behalf of the French and German safety authorities. The outcome of the design optioneering process in terms of the principal design options that were selected and rejected to achieve a balanced design, in terms of the fundamental requirement to minimise risks to workers and the public, while achieving practical constructability and a cost-effective design, is presented. The rationale for the evolution of the design, and the improvements from predecessor designs, are explained along with the reasons why certain features were selected and others rejected. It is demonstrated that the process of design optimisation adopted to minimise risk due to accidents and to optimise operator dose in normal plant operation and accidents is closely analogous to the formal UK approach of ALARP. Download
Sub-Chapter 17.2 - Demonstration of Relevant Good Practice in EPR Design.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	391.24 KB
Sub-chapter 17.2 provides the required demonstration of relevant good practice and includes: a review of both the experience of EPR™ designers and the review and assessment process applied to the design, including a summary of the R&D effort underpinning the EPR™ design; a review of the design codes used in EPR™ design, including reference to international and national codes; a summary of the use of operational feedback, in particular from French and German plants, in optimising EPR™ design; and a discussion of a comparison of the UK EPR™ design against the ONR safety assessment principles, to confirm that all the key nuclear safety requirements embodied in the SAPs are met by the UK EPR™ design. Download
Sub-Chapter 17.1 - Explanation of ALARP Requirement.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	91.83 KB
Sub-chapter 17.1 provides an overview of the requirements of the ALARP principle. UK Health and Safety Legislation places a duty on all companies to conduct their operations such that the risk posed to their workers and members of the public is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). In the context of a nuclear power plant, this duty requires that all measures are taken during design and operation to minimise radiation doses to workers or members of the public, provided the cost of such measures is not disproportionately large compared with the benefits achieved. For generic design acceptance, it is proposed that supporting safety submissions should include the following information: a demonstration of relevant good practice; a review of design options considered in the design process; presentation of results of a probabilistic risk assessment; and arguments that no further reasonable practicable improvements could be implemented, and therefore the risk has been reduced to ALARP. Download
Sub-Chapter 16.6 – Analysis of Extreme Beyond Design Basis Events Carried Out in Response to Fukushima.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	269.75 KB
Sub-chapter 16.6 outlines the analysis of the robustness of the UK EPR™ design against extreme events, carried out in response to the Fukushima event that occurred in March 2011. The sub-chapter reviews the ability of the UK EPR™ to withstand severe external events, (notably major seismic and external flooding events of magnitudes beyond those considered in the current design). It also presents the time periods that would be available for operators to take action to prevent the release of radioactivity to the environment in hypothetical scenarios involving total loss of AC power and ultimate heat sink. Design modifications are described which are being implemented to enhance the robustness of UK EPR™ systems, structures and components against such extreme beyond design basis events. Download
Sub-Chapter 16.5 - Adequacy of the UK EPR™ design regarding functional diversity.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	5.05 MB
Sub-chapter 16.5 provides a demonstration of the adequacy of the functional diversity of the UK EPR™ design. Functional diversity is addressed for all the frequent postulated initiating events (including front line systems and support systems), as these have higher requirements for mitigation. The safety functions are composed of plant level safety functions and the diversity is demonstrated within the plant level safety functions for all the frequent faults. Since some events are more bounding than others for a given plant level safety function, a comprehensive review of the transients is performed to select the limiting events before their examination by calculations. The sub-chapter is comprised of two parts: firstly, the methodology assessing the frequent events and the safety functions considered is presented and the selection of the most limiting events for each plant level safety function is demonstrated, and secondly, the limiting events are analysed by calculations or argumentations to demonstrate that the safety criteria are met. Download
Sub-Chapter 16.4 - Specific Studies.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	7.39 MB
Sub-chapter 16.4 presents the deterministic assessment of six specific faults: a double ended break of the main coolant line (2A-LOCA); a double-ended break of the main steam line outside the containment (2A-SLB); a steam generator tube rupture (1 tube) with main steam line break; a steam generator tube rupture (1 tube) with the affected steam generator main steam relief train stuck open; a multiple steam generator tube rupture (10 tubes in one steam generator at power) and spurious reactor protection system actuation. Assessment of the faults is presented, including description of the analysis methods, main assumptions and models used. In addition to these six specific faults the safety cases for the following types of events are also presented in this sub-chapter: heterogeneous boron dilution faults, faults linked with the Spent Fuel Pool (e.g.; connected pipework, cask loading pit faults or faults in fuel transfer tube) and faults associated with the failure of support systems (e.g.; ventilation, electrical and cooling chain). Download
Sub-Chapter 16.3 - Practically eliminated situations.pdf	Pre-Construction Safety Report (PCSR)	20-06-2023	132.63 KB
Sub-chapter 16.3 presents sequences that are considered to be "practically eliminated". In the EPR™ context, "practical elimination" refers to the implementation of specific design measures to reduce the risk of a large early release of radioactive material to the environment to as low as reasonably practicable. To achieve practical elimination, each type of accident sequence that could lead to a large early release of radioactivity is examined and addressed by design measures. Demonstration of practical elimination of an accident sequence takes into account uncertainties due to the limited knowledge of physical phenomena involved in severe accident analysis. Conditions covered by specific treatment leading to their practical elimination are those which are liable to give rise to significant early releases; mainly high-pressure core meltdown sequences. The sequences considered in this approach are related to severe accidents and containment bypass situations. Download