

DCO TRAFFIC INCIDENT MANAGEMENT PLAN

March 2019

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

- 1.1.1 NNB Generation Company Limited (part of EDF Energy and hereafter referred to as 'EDF Energy') is proposing to develop a new nuclear power station at Hinkley Point C (HPC) adjacent to the existing Hinkley Point Power Station Complex in Somerset.
- 1.1.2 EDF Energy submitted a Development Consent Order (DCO) application for development of HPC to the Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC) in October 2011. The works applied for through the DCO are referred to hereafter as HPC construction works.
- 1.1.3 This DCO Traffic Incident Management Plan (DCO TIMP) outlines the arrangements for the control of development-related traffic in order for EDF Energy to play its part in minimising potential impacts of the development on the response times and delivery of Emergency Services in the event of an incident within the Incident Management Area.
- 1.1.4 As part of the DCO application, EDF Energy prepared a Transport Assessment which set out the traffic impact of the HPC Project in terms of impact on journey times, queuing and delay and road safety. Appropriate measures are proposed by EDF Energy to mitigate the impacts in line with relevant planning guidance. A TIMP is not a normal requirement of a planning application, and as such the production of the DCO TIMP demonstrates EDF Energy's commitment to constructively work with the highway authorities and emergency services to manage traffic incidents on the highway network.
- 1.1.5 This DCO TIMP has been based on the agreed objectives, aims and principles of the Site Preparation and Preliminary Works TIMP, which was prepared following consultation with Somerset County Council (SCC), the emergency services and the Highways England (HE). A number of potential scenarios with varying degrees of impact affecting traffic flow and associated delay have been considered; further details of which can be found in Section 14.
- 1.1.6 This DCO TIMP draws on and includes information from a number of other documents produced in relation to the DCO application, as referenced below:
- Transport Assessment;
 - DCO Construction Traffic Management Plan (DCO CTMP); and
 - DCO Traffic Monitoring and Management System (DCO TMMS) - which is an appendix to the DCO CTMP.
- 1.1.7 Where extracts have been drawn from these documents full references have been provided within the text in order that additional background information can be sought by the reader if necessary.

1.2 Scope

- 1.2.1 This DCO TIMP sets out the arrangements that EDF Energy will put in place to control HGV and bus movements to and from the HPC development site in the event of an incident within the Incident Management Area (IMA). This DCO TIMP demonstrates EDF Energy's willingness to manage and mitigate the impact of HPC construction traffic on the highway network.
- 1.2.2 This DCO TIMP will also be used to further develop the joint working practices between EDF Energy, SCC, the emergency services and the HE to respond to and safely manage an event/incident within the IMA.
- 1.2.3 The DCO TIMP should be viewed as an overarching strategic document. Over time, in light of the experience learnt through the management of events/incidents, it is likely that more detailed protocols will stem from the principles set out within this document. It should also be noted that discussion of the responses to an incident in this document is largely of a generic nature but it is of course recognised that the significance and seriousness of individual incidents will vary greatly and that responses will be modified as appropriate.
- 1.2.4 The production of the DCO TIMP has been based on established procedures already in place with the local highway authority and emergency services, and good practice guidance produced by the HE in conjunction with other key responders. This guidance indicates that the key elements of incident management planning are:
- Incident Detection
 - Incident Verification
 - Incident Response
 - Traveller Information
 - Site Management
 - Traffic Management
 - Site Clearance
 - Monitoring
- 1.2.5 In addition to this list set out within the guidance, and in light of the scale and nature of the HPC NSIP Project, it is suggested that the following practice should be incorporated in this case, to ensure appropriate processes in respect of incident management planning are undertaken:
- Advanced identification of potential incidents
- 1.2.6 This document forms part of a package of management documents to assist in the operational control of transport movements for the HPC construction works. **Figure 1.1** below illustrates the suite of management documents to be implemented for the HPC construction works to provide the context of the DCO TIMP.

Figure 1.1: Transport Management Plans for HPC Construction Works

Management Plan	Construction Workforce Travel Plan (CWTP)	Construction Traffic Management Plan (CTMP)	Traffic Incident Management Plan (TIMP)
Movements to be managed	People Movements	Freight Movements	Park and Ride Bus and HGV Movements
Monitoring System	Monitoring of Mode Share Targets through smartcard type system	Traffic Management and Monitoring System (TMMS)	Traffic Management and Monitoring System (TMMS)

1.3 Structure

1.3.1 The structure of this DCO TIMP is as follows:

- Section 2: provides a summary of the roles and responsibilities of EDF Energy, the highway authorities and the emergency services with respect to traffic incident management.
- Section 3: provides a summary of the anticipated traffic volumes as a result of the construction of HPC, specifically construction traffic flows in 2013 and 2016, before and after the construction of the Cannington bypass.
- Section 4: identifies the geographical area to which this DCO TIMP relates.
- Section 5: provides details on the detection methods of an incident.
- Section 6: provides details on the verification of an incident.
- Section 7: sets out the response to the detection of an incident.
- Section 8: summarises how information on incidents is disseminated to drivers.
- Section 9: provides information on how an incident scene is managed.
- Section 10: provides information on the traffic management of an incident.
- Section 11: addresses the clearance of an incident.
- Section 12: provides information on the monitoring of an incident.

- Section 13: describes a number of incident scenarios which have been considered.
- Section 14: provides a summary and conclusions.

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2. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 In developing an effective TIMP, it is important to understand the roles that the various organisations will play in incident management within the IMA, (details of which are provided in Section 4). In this case, the organisations are:

- The highway authorities (The HE and SCC);
- The emergency services:
 - Avon and Somerset Constabulary (ASC);
 - Devon and Somerset Fire and Rescue Service (DSFRS); and
 - South Western Ambulance Service Trust (SWAST).
- EDF Energy

2.2 Roles and Responsibilities

a) Highway Authorities

2.2.1 The Traffic Management Act (TMA) 2004 places a Network Management Duty on all highway authorities to ensure road networks are managed effectively to minimise congestion and disruption to traffic.

2.2.2 The HE is responsible for managing the Strategic Road Network (SRN) and SCC is responsible for managing the local road network within Somerset and the highway authorities are prepared to facilitate the identification of potential significant road works that could create an incident, which has the potential to impact on HPC construction.

2.2.3 In the event of an incident on the SRN or local road network either the HA or SCC's role (depending on road hierarchy) is generally to:

- initiate traffic management strategies on incident impacted facilities;
- protect the incident scene;
- initiate emergency medical assistance until help arrives;
- provide traffic control;
- assist motorists with disabled vehicles;
- provide traveller information;
- determine road repair needs;
- establish and operate alternative diversionary routes; and

- repair highway infrastructure.

b) Emergency Services

2.2.4 In the event of an incident ASC is often the first organisation to become aware that the highway network is not functioning as it should through reported incidents by the public to their control centre. It's key roles and responsibilities are to:

- assist with incident detection and verification;
- secure the incident scene;
- assist disabled motorists;
- provide emergency medical aid until help arrives;
- direct traffic;
- arrange transportation for the injured;
- conduct accident investigations;
- serve as incident commander;
- safeguard personal property;
- coordinate clearance and repair resources if requested; and
- supervise scene clearance if requested and dependent on seriousness of incident.

2.2.5 ASC will contact the other emergency services (i.e. DSFRS and SWAST) as required during the management of an incident.

2.2.6 DSFRS will assist ASC at the scene of an incident and its roles and responsibilities will be to:

- protect the incident scene;
- provide traffic control until police or local authorities arrive;
- provide emergency medical care;
- provide initial hazardous material response and containment;
- suppress any fire;
- rescue crash victims from wrecked vehicles;
- rescue crash victims from contaminated environments;
- serve as incident commander, where appropriate; and
- assist in incident clearance if requested and dependent on seriousness of incident.

2.2.7 Where required, SWAST will be in attendance at the scene of an incident. It's roles and responsibilities relate to the triage, treatment and transport of injured victims, and will be to:

- provide advanced emergency medical care;
- determine the destination and transportation requirements for the injured;
- coordinate the evacuation with fire and police responders;

- serve as incident commander for medical emergencies;
- determine approximate cause of injuries for the receiving medical centres; and
- remove medical waste from incident scene.

c) EDF Energy

2.2.8 EDF Energy has no statutory responsibilities in the event of a traffic incident on the road network. However, as part of the development of this DCO TIMP, EDF Energy will assist with incident management planning through:

- positively controlling the number and frequency of HGVs on the approved HGV routes;
- providing data to SCC for all vehicles passing every ANPR outstation on the approved HGV routes between Junctions 23 and 24 and the HPC development site and Combwich for their own incident management needs;
- cascading incident management information to all contractors who are due to make a delivery on a given day;
- providing an appropriate communications process for bus drivers;
- holding HGVs at agreed control points until it is appropriate to release them;
- holding HGVs at the Freight Management Facilities (FMF) at Junction 23 and Junction 24 of the M5 motorway, once these sites become operational;
- holding buses at the park and ride sites and accommodation campuses in the event of an incident within the IMA until it is appropriate to release them;
- having a site based delivery management team to act as a contact point for contractors, ASC and SCC. This team will help manage and coordinate EDF Energy's response to an incident within the IMA;
- the EDF Energy Delivery Coordinator having the ability to amend or cancel bookings in the Delivery Management System (DMS) at any time and all changes automatically being notified to contractors delivering to site; and
- Variable Message Signs (VMS) procured by EDF Energy to be utilised by SCC to display messages to drivers to take action as required (i.e. follow diversion routes) during an incident.

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3. HPC CONSTRUCTION WORKS AND TRAFFIC IMPACT

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 This section provides a summary of the anticipated traffic volumes and impacts as a result of the HPC Construction Works. Further information can be found in the DCO application and supporting documentation.

3.2 HGV Routes

3.2.1 SCC’s Local Transport Plan 2 provides information on freight management. **Figure 3.1** shows the national, regional and county freight routes within Somerset.

Figure 3.1: National, Regional and County Freight Routes in Somerset



3.2.2 EDF Energy will adhere to the key elements set out in the Somerset Local Transport Plan on freight management which are as follows:


- wherever possible HGVs should use the strategic road network; and
- HGVs will adhere to the National, Regional and County Freight Routes set out in **Figure 3.1**.

3.2.3 Two HGV routes are proposed from the M5 motorway to the HPC development site during the construction of HPC:

- Route 1: The proposed HGV route from Junction 23 of the M5 motorway would be via the A38 Bristol Road, The Drove, the Northern Distributor Road (NDR), the A39, Cannington bypass and the C182 to the HPC development site.
- Route 2: The proposed HGV route from Junction 24 of the M5 motorway would be via the A38 Taunton Road, the A39 Broadway, Cannington bypass and the C182 to the HPC development site.

3.2.4 Each HGV Route is shown in **Figure 3.2**.

Figure 3.2: HGV Routes to HPC development site



3.3 HGV Movements

3.3.1 EDF Energy will control the number of HGV movements that are permitted as part of the HPC construction works. The controls set out below will be applied to the following HGV movements:

- HGVs to and from the HPC development site;
- HGVs involved in the construction of the HPC accommodation campus;
- HGVs to and from Comwich Wharf; and

- HGV movements that route through Cannington associated with the construction of the Cannington bypass.

3.3.2 The above HGV movements for the HPC construction works will be subject to a limit that the number of HGV movements will not exceed an average of 500 movements per day in any given quarter. The limit will be applied to HGV movements on the C182 Rodway north of Cannington at the location of the junction of the C182 with the new Cannington bypass.

3.3.3 The above HGV movements will also be subject to the following limits and constraints, monitored at the same location:

- a one day maximum limit of 750 HGV movements (Monday – Friday); and
- a one day maximum limit of 375 HGV movements (Saturdays).

3.3.4 In addition it is proposed that the above HGV movements travelling on the HGV Routes through Bridgwater will be subject to the following limits:

- a one day maximum limit of 450 HGV movements on HGV Route 1; and
- a one day maximum limit of 300 HGV movements on HGV Route 2.

3.3.5 In addition to the limits on the number of HGV movements, it is proposed that the HGV movements set out above will be subject to the following timing constraints:

- There will be no HGV movements on the local highway network between the Freight Management Facilities and the HPC development site between the hours of 22:00 and 07:00.
- Morning peak hour HGV movements on the local highway network to the HPC development site and Combrich will be limited to 30 movements (08:00-09:00) and evening peak hour movements will be limited to 40 movements (17:00-18:00). These limits will be applied Monday-Friday and on the C182 Rodway north of Cannington at the location of the junction of the C182 with the new Cannington bypass.
- There will be no HPC construction related HGV movements on the local highway network on Sundays or on Bank Holidays.
- The target for morning peak period HPC Construction Works HGV movements on the local highway network will be 40 movements (07:00-08:00) and 50 movements (09:00-10:00). The target for evening peak period HPC Construction Works HGV movements on the local highway network will be 50 movements (16:00-17:00) and 40 movements (18:00-19:00). These targets will be applied Monday-Friday and on the C182 Rodway north of Cannington, at the location of the junction of the C182 with the new Cannington bypass. Failure to meet these targets would trigger the default mechanisms set out in the DCO CTMP.

3.4 Exceptional Circumstances

3.4.1 It may be necessary to temporarily suspend the above controls on HGV movements and HGV routes in the event of a range of exceptional circumstances impacting on HGV movements to and from the HPC development site.

3.4.2 Such 'exceptional circumstances' comprise:

- a traffic or other similar incident on the highway network that delays a HGV such that it misses its allocated slot or falls outside the permitted working hours;
- a breakdown of a HGV en-route to the site;
- inclement weather (e.g. high winds, flooding, snow or ice) that significantly disrupts the normal operation of the highway network;
- circumstances associated with demonstrations or protests; and
- significant road works along the defined HGV routes or the TIMP diversionary routes which may affect traffic management in the wider Incident Management Area.

3.4.3 In all these cases that may result in a potential delay to HGVs being received to site or dispatched from it, the key considerations will be:

- the impact of the occurrence on the highway network e.g. as a result of rejecting a HGV at the site, thus resulting in a rescheduling and additional HGV journey; and
- the impact of the occurrence on the aspect of work being undertaken on site and whether the rejection of a HGV may result in a potential health and safety issue due to the lack of appropriate material/equipment.

3.4.4 In addition, the exceptional circumstances may lead to the need for HGVs to be:

- diverted via the diversionary routes set out in Appendix B. In the event that HGVs are diverted, the HGV routes will be temporarily suspended.
- Allowed to use extended delivery hours, for example between 05:00 – 07:00 and 22:00 – 00:00, to be agreed on a case by case basis with appropriate environmental information provided to assess environmental effects which will be monitored during such extended delivery hours.

3.4.6 It is envisaged that any departure from the controls on HGV movements set out in this section, arising from the exceptional circumstances set out in paragraph 3.4.2 above, would be of only a temporary nature linked to the completion of any significant road works or clearing of the traffic incident/weather or protest event which generated the departure.

3.5 Abnormal Indivisible Loads

- 3.5.1 The construction of HPC will require the movement of Abnormal Indivisible Loads (AILs) to bring construction plant and some heavy construction components to the site.
- 3.5.2 The largest AILs are to be transported by water to Comwich Wharf and then escorted by road via the C182 to the HPC development site. It is estimated that there will be 180 large AILs arriving by sea. The majority of these AIL deliveries will be associated with an approximate four-year period in the middle of the HPC construction programme, once Comwich Wharf is operational.
- 3.5.3 There will also be a number of other AILs that will be dispatched by road or by sea to Comwich Wharf wherever possible.
- 3.5.4 All AILs to be dispatched by road will be managed via the HE's 'Electronic Service Delivery for Abnormal Loads' (ESDAL) system to deliver fully compliant notifications to the relevant organisations (i.e. HA, SCC and the police) and the details of the AIL deliveries before the movements are made.
- 3.5.5 The Road (Authorisation of Special Types) (General) Order 2003 sets out the categories of AILs with regard to weight, width and length.
- 3.5.6 The Special Types Order 2003 does not specify any width, length or weight for police or self-escort. The police have advised that decisions regarding the movement of
- 3.5.7 AILs are taken at a local level based on notified dimensions and route. They further advised that there would be an increased requirement to self-escort for these types of loads.
- 3.5.8 If the weight of the load exceeds 44 tonnes, it is a requirement to give five clear days notice to the appropriate authorities. Each contractor will remain responsible for the movement of its AILs, under the management of EDF Energy. EDF Energy will include clauses in the contracts with its contractors that all AIL movements should be in accordance with the relevant Highway Authority procedures and notification protocols.

3.6 Bus Movements

- 3.6.1 EDF Energy's transport strategy provides four park and ride sites, which will consolidate car based journeys for the construction workers. Along with direct bus services from key locations, this will allow the majority of the workforce to travel to and from the HPC construction site by bus. All HPC buses will be provided free to HPC workers.
- 3.6.2 The latest set out bus timetables are summarised in the Addendum to the Environmental Statement (March 2012). These will be subject to further refinement upon the appointment of a bus operator.

3.7 Impact of HPC Construction Works Traffic

a) Traffic Volumes

- 3.7.1 The Transport Assessment demonstrates, through the use of junction capacity assessments at the junctions along the prescribed HGV routes, that the traffic generated by HPC has a negligible impact on queuing and delay and journey times during the highway network and development peak periods as summarised below.
- 3.7.2 In addition to the assessment using the Paramics model (a computer software package that assesses and reports on the interaction of vehicle movements through a highway network), assessments have been undertaken for key junctions on the prescribed HGV routes, the scope of which was agreed with SCC. The junction assessments show that HPC traffic does not have a material impact on the operation of the junctions (i.e. queue lengths or journey times) and therefore the emergency response times should not be affected by development traffic in this regard.
- 3.7.3 It should also be noted that the 'platooning' of HGV traffic whereby a large number of HGVs would group together and potentially impede the passing of emergency vehicles is unlikely to occur due to the inherent profile of arrivals/departures of HGVs servicing the site which would be spread out throughout any particular time period. In addition the FMF at Junction 23 and Junction 24 of the M5 and the DMS, which will be in operation, will restrict this occurring as HGVs will be allocated delivery time slots which they will have to adhere to. HGV movements will also be managed through the DCO CTMP. It should also be noted that the provision of a set number of delivery slots within the DMS will help to regulate the arrival of HGVs to the FMF via the SRN.
- 3.7.4 Further information and details of the impact of HPC traffic on the local highway network can be found in Chapter 15 of the Transport Assessment and in Chapter 2 of the Addendum to the Environmental Statement.

b) Highway Safety

- 3.7.5 The impact on highway safety as a result of HPC traffic on the highway network has been undertaken by reviewing the existing accidents rates (per million vehicle km) and National Average rates (per million vehicle km) set out in Road Casualties Great Britain: 2009 (RCGB).
- 3.7.6 A standard calculation on predicting the number of collisions per year has then been undertaken using the forecast increase in traffic flows as a result of the development scenarios.
- 3.7.7 In 2016 the results of this assessment has indicated that the impact of HPC traffic on the local highway network has been calculated to be an

additional maximum of 0.03 Personal Injury Collisions (PIC) per year on the busiest section of the A39 (link O1), 0.08 PIC per year on the busiest section of the A38 (link I1), 0.47 PIC per year on the NDR (link AE), and a reduction of 1.69 PIC per year on the C182 (south of bypass).

- 3.7.8 Based on this assessment it is therefore considered that the road safety impact on the local road network is negligible. The reduction in accident rates on the C182 in 2016 is due to the reduction in traffic flows on this route as a result of the construction of Cannington bypass.
- 3.7.9 Notwithstanding this, where highway improvements were included within the DCO application, road safety enhancements were incorporated within the designs. EDF Energy has also committed within the Section 106 Agreement to provide a contribution to SCC to assist with the implementation of a package of road safety measures which will provide benefit to the local community. In addition, EDF Energy will work with contractors to educate drivers on the importance of driver behaviour.
- 3.7.10 Further details on highway safety can be found in Chapter 14 of the Transport Assessment.

4. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT AREA

4.1 Introduction

- 4.1.1 This section identifies the geographical area to which this DCO TIMP relates. The area has been determined based on the level, anticipated source and route of traffic generated by the HPC development.

4.2 Incident Management Area (IMA)

- 4.2.1 The IMA for HPC includes the following road network:

- M5 motorway between and including Junctions 23 and 24;
- A39 between Cannington and Bridgwater;
- A38 between Dunball roundabout and Huntworth roundabout; and
- roads within Cannington and Bridgwater.

- 4.2.2 It also includes the diversion routes through Taunton that may be implemented in the event of a major incident along the A39 between Bridgwater and Cannington.

- 4.2.3 **Figure 4.1** illustrates the IMA.

Figure 4.1: Incident Management Area for HPC



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5. DETECTION

5.1 Significant Road Works

Identification

- 5.1.1 In conjunction with the local authorities and HE, EDF Energy will meet regularly to review known road works in the area and identify where these road works may have a potential impact on HPC construction and specifically the transport implications of those road works.
- 5.1.2 Where EDF Energy considers that any road works are 'significant', for the purposes of paragraph 3.4.2, in advance of the road works commencing, written confirmation will be obtained from the relevant local planning authorities that, in the opinion of the relevant local planning authority, the roadworks are 'significant' and may affect traffic management in the wider Incident Management Area. The relevant local planning authority will then determine whether exceptional circumstances exist. If the local planning authorities consider that exceptional circumstances exist, the relevant local planning authorities shall consider any application by EDF Energy to implement any approved changes to delivery hours as set out in Paragraph 3.4.4 or other changes as appropriate. In determining such an application, the reasonable representations of Somerset County Council and Highways England should be sought and taken into account, as respective local and strategic highways authorities.
- 5.1.3 The period of extended delivery hours and any proposed mitigation, for example specific changes to vehicle numbers during peak periods and school travel times, will be set out in writing to the relevant local authorities, for consideration on a case by case basis alongside the necessary environmental information

Verification

- 5.1.4 The relevant local authorities will respond in writing to any requests to extend the delivery hours and any proposed mitigation (such as vary movements during peak periods and school travel times) during significant road works. Written confirmation of exceptional circumstances existing, or reasons for non-acceptance, will be provided within 5 working days once all necessary information and evidence to support the request has been received by the relevant local authorities.

Response

- 5.1.5 Subject to confirmation of exceptional circumstances, EDF Energy will implement the agreed variation and liaise with the contractors to enable a limited number of deliveries to be booked within the extended delivery hours through the Delivery Management System, with associated environmental monitoring in place. The extended delivery hours will cease when the road works are removed from the highway.

Monitoring

- 5.1.6 EDF Energy will continue the monitoring process to ensure HGV traffic associated with HPC adheres to the prescribed HGV routes and will also monitor the revised delivery hours, movements and any environmental impacts i.e. noise and air quality effects. These will be reported to the relevant personnel at the local planning authorities in writing, and made available to TRG for information, on a quarterly basis. The methodology for environmental monitoring and reporting will be agreed in advance with the local planning authorities and prior to the submission of any request.


5.2 Incident Detection

- 5.2.1 The first key component of the DCO TIMP is the detection of an incident. It is vital that incidents are detected quickly and reported accurately so that the appropriate response can be mobilised and the network can be returned to normal conditions.
- 5.2.2 Traffic is likely to be most disrupted in the immediate aftermath of an incident and therefore the quicker an incident is detected, the quicker the appropriate response can be determined and key staff and equipment dispatched.
- 5.2.3 The early detection of traffic incidents is vital as it minimises the exposure of those involved in the incident, speeds the implementation of traffic control, reduces the duration of the loss in traffic flow and minimises overall incident impact.
- 5.2.4 In addition to the early warning of significant road works via liaison with the local authorities and HE, receipt of calls from motorists or the public involved in or witnessing an incident, the common methods of detecting traffic incidents include:
- Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) cameras viewed by operators;
 - Automatic Vehicle Identification (AVI) combined with detection software;
 - police patrols;
 - aerial surveillance; and roaming service patrols.

5.3 Current Arrangements

- 5.3.1 Many of the above methods are currently employed in Somerset although, in the majority of cases, the initial detection of a traffic incident on the highway network occurs via phone calls from members of the public who have either been involved in the incident or are present at the scene.
- 5.3.2 ASC are often the first to receive notice of an incident, as receiver of '999' calls, although they can also detect incidents because of their role in traffic patrol and traffic law enforcement. The police therefore have the key role in incident detection.
- 5.3.3 SCC has installed fixed CCTV cameras and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras in the centre of Bridgwater. The location of these cameras is shown in **Figure 5.1**. In addition, a CCTV camera is located at the Huntworth Roundabout near the M5 Motorway. The existing CCTV cameras allow the early detection of traffic incidents in their immediate vicinity or can indicate the occurrence of such an incident further afield through the presence of congestion.

Figure 5.1: Location of Existing CCTV and ANPR Cameras



- 5.3.4 It is SCC policy to install CCTV cameras at each junction that is controlled by traffic signals as and when the signal equipment is replaced or upgraded.

5.3.5 It is understood from discussions with ASC that the current methods of traffic incident detection in Somerset are comparable to those used throughout the UK.

5.4 EDF Energy's Role

5.4.1 EDF Energy's future role in assisting in the detection and response to an incident will be through the provision of the TMMS that will incorporate the monitoring and management of HPC HGV related traffic through the use of an Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) system and a Delivery Management System (DMS).

5.4.2 The ANPR system, full details of which are contained in DCO TMMS appended to the DCO CTMP, will be maintained during the construction of HPC and will allow HPC HGV related traffic to be monitored and managed throughout the lifetime of construction of HPC. While the principal purpose and function of ANPR cameras is not to detect incidents on the network, it is possible that they may assist on some occasions. EDF Energy has committed to provide data to SCC for all vehicles passing every ANPR outstation on the approved HGV routes between Junctions 23 and 24 and the HPC site and Combwich for their own incident management needs.

5.4.3 The DMS is a web based booking system which will be managed by EDF Energy and the results reported through the Transport Review Group.

5.4.4 The TMMS will assist in the management of an incident through the following measures:

- by controlling the number and frequency of HGVs on the approved HGV routes;
- by providing raw data from the ANPR system to SCC for their own incident management needs;
- by being able to cascade incident management information via e-mail to all contractors who are due to make a delivery on a given day;
- by holding HGVs at the control points until it is appropriate to release them;
- by holding HGVs at Freight Management Facilities at Junction 23 and Junction 24;
- by having a site based delivery management team to act as a contact point for contractors, ASC and SCC. This team will help manage and coordinate EDF Energy's response to an incident in the area;
- the delivery management team will support the site emergency arrangements which cover both on-site and off-site incidents and emergencies. The Site Emergency Co-ordinator will manage and

co-ordinate the EDF Energy response to any incident via the appropriate emergency services;

- by the EDF Energy Delivery Coordinator having the ability to amend or cancel bookings in the system at any time and all changes automatically being notified to contractors delivering to site via pager or other forms of contact (subject to prioritising the health and safety of drivers); and
- Variable Message Signs (VMS) procured by EDF Energy will be utilised by SCC to display messages to drivers to take action as required (i.e. follow diversion route) during an incident.

5.4.5 For further details refer to the TMMS appended to the DCO CTMP.

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6. VERIFICATION

6.1 Introduction

6.1.1 With the exception of advanced identification of significant road works, detection of an incident on the highway network by the initial responder, which in nearly all occasions would be the Emergency Services a verification process is carried out. This will comprise the following elements:

- verify the nature and location of the incident through CCTV and Police presence at the scene;
- identify the resources and organisations required;
- stabilise the scene and implement immediate safety measures;
- identify and tackle the aspects that require immediate attention;
- supply responders and their organisations with essential information;
- control the incident and prevent it from escalating;
- establish initial command, control and co-ordination of the incident scene; and
- plan initial response phase.

6.1.2 An understanding of the likely timescales for ‘clearance’ of the incident will be important in the decision making process as this will determine what level of response will be required by all of the key parties involved e.g. short-term incident would probably not require temporary signs put up for local diversionary routes, whereas a long-term incident would require alternative routes signed for general traffic and HPC traffic.

6.2 Current Arrangements

6.2.1 CCTV cameras are currently available in Bridgwater and at the Huntworth Roundabout near the M5 motorway (see **Figure 5.1:**) and can help enable verification of incidents on the road network around Bridgwater. It should be noted that in areas covered by CCTV cameras, ASC attend the scene of an incident to verify the details.

6.2.2 If the traffic incident is on the SRN, the HE verify incidents through use of CCTV, MIDAS and other technology or through the deployment of Traffic Officers.

6.2.3 As part of the Site Preparation and Jetty Construction Works additional ANPR cameras will be installed to monitor and manage development related HGVs. This network of ANPR cameras will be maintained throughout the construction of HPC. Additional ANPR cameras will also be installed at each FMF.

6.3 EDF Energy's Role

- 6.3.1 EDF Energy will have no direct role in the verification of an incident unless it directly involves their operation (e.g. protest at the site access) or a vehicle related to the HPC Project.

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7. RESPONSE

7.1 Overview

- 7.1.1 With the exception of the identification of significant road works, it is usual that ASC is the first organisation to be informed of any incident on the highway network. If the ASC control room receives the first call about an incident, they will clarify and confirm the location and details of the incident, and co-ordinate the appropriate response from other responders if required.
- 7.1.2 If either the DSFRS or SWAST is the first organisation to receive the call, their control room staff will immediately inform the ASC of the incident.
- 7.1.3 Once ASC and or other Emergency Service are aware of an incident it would be normal for an officer to be dispatched to the scene to manage the incident and to advise other services and/or request further resources.
- 7.1.4 The current protocols in place between ASC, SCC and the HE ensure that each of the responders is aware of their responsibilities, a number of which are summarised below:
- SCC can advise travellers of the incident by means of VMS or other systems. This will also assist with their Network Management responsibilities.
 - SCC can provide highway maintenance resources to repair/clear the highway.
 - ASC is aware that maintenance/clearance work is completed and that the road is ready to open.

7.2 EDF Energy's Role

- 7.2.1 EDF Energy's primary role in assisting in the response to an incident during the construction of HPC will be to immediately advise its suppliers after it has been notified by ASC, SCC or the HE of an incident and reduce or stop any additional HGV traffic from entering the IMA, as appropriate. EDF Energy will provide key points of contact to ASC, SCC and the HE to facilitate communications of this nature in the event of an incident.
- 7.2.2 In the event of an incident that requires development-related HGV and buses to and from the HPC development site to be suspended, then working with its contractors EDF Energy will:

a) Notify

- Notify suppliers registered in the DMS for making a delivery to the site that day to inform them of the incident to suspend deliveries until further notice. Communication between EDF Energy and the suppliers will be via the telephone and communication between the suppliers and their drivers will be via the means they normally use e.g. pagers, radio (subject to prioritising the health and safety of drivers). A plan agreed as part of the Site Preparation and Preliminary Works TIMP showing the potential locations where HGVs can pull over, before entering the IMA in the event of an incident is shown at Appendix A of this document. At these locations HGV drivers will be able to contact the delivery management team for authority to proceed. It should be noted that further work has been undertaken by SCC with regards to suitable HGV parking facilities in the South West region in terms of location, capacity and utilisation. EDF Energy will liaise with SCC to update the plan in **Appendix A**, where appropriate, based on the recent SCC work and agree the finalised plan with SCC and the HE. As set out in the DCO CTMP, the agreed plan will be disseminated as part of the information pack to all contractors to be issued to their HGV drivers.
- EDF Energy will ensure that a communications process is in place such that bus drivers en-route and at park and ride sites and accommodation campuses are aware of any emerging problems or incidents on the network. The stakeholders will be consulted on the communication process.
- The portable Variable Message Signs (VMS), funded by EDF Energy, to be located at strategic locations along the route could be used to notify drivers of an incident prior to the construction of Cannington bypass, and on Cannington bypass post construction. This would be the responsibility of SCC.
- HGVs/buses en-route to the site that have passed all of the above notification measures will be warned by EDF Energy of an incident on approach to the site access if appropriate through the use of mobile signs or other appropriate measures e.g. flagging vehicles down.

b) Hold Vehicles

- Once the FMFs are operational HGVs can also be held at these locations. The FMFs have capacity to hold up to 140 HGVs at any one time which is considered sufficient for them to play an important role in holding HGVs – prior to travel through Bridgwater or Cannington - in the event of an incident. The provision of holding spaces that may be required in the event of an incident is considered robust, especially given the ability and commitment by EDF Energy to contact suppliers/contractors to restrict HGV deliveries from their point of origin until it is appropriate to do so.

- Hold buses at the park and ride facilities and accommodation campuses until ASC or SCC have communicated that the roads are clear or an alternative route is confirmed. A plan showing the space to be utilised by buses being held will be submitted to the stakeholders.
- Hold HGVs and buses that have not yet left the HPC development site within the on-site holding area until ASC or SCC have communicated that the roads are clear or an alternative route is confirmed.
- It is anticipated that, overnight and outside of shift pattern changeover periods, buses will be held in a range of locations including the park and ride developments, accommodation campuses and potentially in some cases existing bus depots of bus service providers. In the event that an incident completely prevents the movement of construction workforce buses, these locations can also be used to hold buses prior to the resolution of an incident as necessary.

c) Divert Vehicles

- If the incident results in a prolonged closure of the highway, the appropriate diversionary route as shown in Appendix B will be used subject to the agreement of the relevant Highway Authority and the Emergency Services. A number of management processes will be put in place including inductions and regular contractor briefings, to ensure that hauliers are aware that there are limited options for diversions and that they must adhere to agreed routes unless otherwise instructed.
- In respect of any given incident, HPC buses will use any diversionary routes applied by or agreed with the local highway authorities or emergency services – ensuring onward travel to and from the construction site for the workforce is maintained wherever possible. It should be noted that the full range of bus services will evolve and adapt over the construction phase in response to patterns of demand. Anticipated diversionary routes will therefore be agreed over time with the relevant highway authority and emergency services. In relation to bus movements from the park and ride locations at Junction 23 and Junction 24 it is anticipated that the diversionary route is likely to be the same as those applying to HGV movements. Other diversionary routes may be required for direct bus services – taking account of the requirement for these buses to have some pick up points for construction workers en-route.

d) Recall Vehicles

Consideration has been given to whether it would be appropriate to recall HPC HGVs and buses that have already entered the IMA in the event of an incident and request that the vehicles return to where they had been dispatched from (i.e. the HPC development site or the FMF,

park and ride sites or accommodation campuses). However, it is not considered appropriate for HPC HGVs and buses to be recalled for the following principle reasons:

- Safety issues with HPC HGVs and buses attempting to u-turn or return to where they were dispatched from via inappropriate roads.
- There would be a point within the IMA at which the vehicles would cause less impact by continuing on their journey than returning to their dispatch point. Such a system would be too complex to implement.
- Communication between EDF Energy and the HGVs drivers would be via the suppliers and would not be direct; therefore it would be difficult within a relatively small IMA to provide prompt information to the drivers.

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8. TRAVEL INFORMATION

8.1 Introduction

8.1.1 In parallel with the incident response, information needs to be disseminated to travellers relating to the traffic incident and its location to allow them to make choices about their route, at what time they make their journey or whether to make the journey at all.

8.1.2 Commonly used techniques include:

- commercial radio broadcasts;
- Variable Message Signs (VMS);
- mobile phone messaging;
- SatNav devices within vehicles;
- commercial and public television traffic reports; and
- internet/on-line services.

8.2 Current Arrangements

8.2.1 The following systems are currently in place to inform travellers of a traffic incident:

- The RAC operate the RAC Traffic Alert and the RAC Route Minder schemes that enable a traveller to get information via their mobile phones or the Internet;
- The HE inform the Central Office of Information (COI) of incidents that they themselves are informed of, and the COI informs the local radio stations;
- ASC provide information on traffic incidents on their website;
- Deployment of Variable Message Signs;
- Travellers who witness either the incident or the tailback may ring into radio stations to inform them of the events; and
- Trafficmaster identifies areas of slow moving traffic and predicts delays via mobile phones, the Internet, or in-car navigation systems.

8.3 SCC Proposals

8.3.1 SCC is currently developing an internet based system (Cloud Amber) that will be available to the public and inform travellers of the current state of the road network within Somerset and include information on planned and unplanned events that are expected to cause a loss of capacity on the network. These could include planned and emergency road works and events on the highway (e.g. the Olympic torch relay) or off the highway (e.g. in the case of the Glastonbury festival) that could result in congestion and delays.

8.3.2 It is envisaged that the SCC Cloud Amber system would in part rely on the dissemination of information from ASC and the HA relating to incidents on the highway, which would enable the system to be updated in real time. It should be noted that SCC has not confirmed a date for the 'roll-out' and implementation of this system.

8.4 EDF Energy's Role

8.4.1 EDF Energy's role in assisting in the dissemination of information to travellers in relation to a traffic incident during the construction of HPC will be through informing employees and contractors of an incident. Section 7.2 of this DCO TIMP summarises the notification procedures that EDF Energy will adopt in the event of an incident.

8.4.2 As part of the Site Preparation and Jetty Construction Works, EDF Energy will fund the provision of additional VMS to complement SCC's existing VMS provision. The additional VMS will enhance the ability to relay information on incidents within the IMA to travellers on the highway network.

9. SCENE MANAGEMENT

9.1 Introduction

9.1.1 Once the appropriate level of response has been identified by ASC, it will be required to manage the scene, which is the process of effectively coordinating and managing on-site resources, ensuring the safety of response personnel, any incident victims and other travellers.

9.1.2 Tasks that are commonly undertaken for scene management are:

- review the severity of the incident and the number of any casualties;
- assist in life saving and attending to any casualties;
- set up temporary road or lane closures with coning, signs and emergency lighting;
- consider access routes for other organisations to reach the scene;
- identify a rendezvous point;
- estimate incident timeframe;
- assess damage to carriageway and road furniture;
- set up cordons - inner cordon for emergency and non-Emergency Services, outer cordon for the public;
- update the control room of the details;
- identify potential witnesses; and
- investigate the causes of the collision and collect and retain evidence.

9.2 Current Arrangements

9.2.1 The initial scene management is generally undertaken by ASC in co-ordination with SCC or the HA, all of which have standard protocols for dealing with such incidents.

9.3 EDF Energy's Role

9.3.1 Due to the inherent nature of scene management, EDF Energy will not have a significant part to play in this; with the possible exception of the initial management of the scene should it occur at the access to the site (e.g. in responding to a protest at the site). In this situation EDF Energy would endeavour to inform drivers by any appropriate means necessary e.g. placing of warning signs prior to an incident at the site access gates or simply warning drivers on the approach to the site.

9.3.2 It will also have a non-direct role through the provision of VMS signs as part of the Site Preparation and Jetty Construction Works to SCC for their use as they see fit (i.e. diverting traffic away from an incident at the scene or further afield prior to their arrival at the scene).

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10. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

10.1 Introduction

10.1.1 In conjunction with site management measures, it is important that traffic on the surrounding road network is managed effectively. This is undertaken through the application of traffic control measures at the incident site and on the wider road network. The objectives are to minimise traffic disruption while maintaining a safe workplace for responders.

10.1.2 The following points provide a summary of the key roles undertaken by ASC in regard to traffic management:

- establishing point traffic control at the scene;
- managing the road space (opening and closing lanes, blocking only the portion of the incident scene that is needed for safety, staging and parking emergency vehicles and equipment to minimise impact on traffic flow);
- identify scene access and egress routes for responders; and
- deploy appropriate personnel to assist in managing traffic (if required).

10.1.3 After the initial response by ASC, the key role of SCC in regard to traffic management includes:

- actively managing traffic control devices (including VMS infrastructure and traffic signals) in the areas where traffic flow is affected by the incident;
- implement, sign and manage closures and diversion routes;
- control, manage and clear trapped traffic on strategic road network;
- manage the welfare needs of trapped road users in line with legislation and policy; • manage scene access for specialists to examine any damaged infrastructure;
- plan, prepare and co-ordinate activities and resources for the recovery phase; and
- identify, plan, prepare and co-ordinate activities and resources to restore network to normality.

10.2 Existing Diversion Routes

10.2.1 The HE currently have a number of existing alternative routes to the east of Bridgwater should an incident occur on the SRN.

10.3 EDF Energy's Role

- 10.3.1 As part of the Site Preparation Works and Jetty Construction Works a number of other proposed diversionary routes were proposed for EDF Energy related HGV traffic should an incident occur on agreed HGV routes to the site. These diversionary routes have been carried forward to this DCO TIMP, with slight amendments to account for incidents in and around Cannington both pre and post construction of the Cannington bypass.
- 10.3.2 These diversions would only be considered should the incident close part of the HGV route for a prolonged period of time. It should be reiterated that the initial response by EDF Energy to a verified incident on HGV routes would be to stop works related traffic entering the IMA and only after discussions with SCC and Emergency Services would the use of the diversionary routes be implemented. It is acknowledged that agreement of an acceptable procedure is likely to be more challenging in the event of an incident on the C182 north of Cannington in which case EDF Energy would be required to work closely with SCC and the Emergency Services to agree the way forward.
- 10.3.3 As set out in Section 7, HPC buses will use any diversionary routes applied by or agreed with the local highway authorities or emergency services – ensuring onward travel to and from the construction site for the workforce is maintained wherever possible.
- 10.3.4 Plans showing the proposed diversion routes, which reflect the routes agreed in the Site Preparation and Preliminary Works TIMP are provided in Appendix B. This includes diversionary routes in the vicinity of Cannington, before and after the construction of the Cannington bypass.

11. CLEARANCE

11.1 Introduction

11.1.1 The final component of incident management is the clearance of an incident from the highway. This is an important stage in the management of traffic incidents on the highway network due to the length of time required to remove obstructions, carry out any remedial highway infrastructure works required, and restore traffic flow.

11.1.2 Clearance is the process of removing vehicles, wreckage, debris, spilled material, and other items from the highway and the immediate area in order to return the network capacity to normal levels. As stated above it may also require repair works to the highway. The objectives of incident clearance are to:

- restore the highway network to its pre-incident capacity as quickly and safely as possible;
- minimise delays for travellers;
- make effective use of all clearance resources;
- enhance the safety of responders and travellers; and
- protect the highway network and private property from unnecessary damage during the removal process.

11.2 Current Arrangements

11.2.1 Incident clearance itself cannot begin until any accident investigation has been completed and this process can take a number of hours. For any fatal incident, or an incident that is likely to become a fatality, ASC are required to gather evidence as to the cause of the incident for the coroner's inquest. This investigation will include recording and gathering debris, taking measurements and recording the images of the scene. SWAST will generally provide the police with an indication before they leave the scene as to whether an incident has the potential to result in a fatality.

11.2.2 When the accident investigation is complete, the debris is cleared from the scene and the vehicle recovery agent can remove the wreckage. Remedial works to the carriageway and the road furniture may either be done immediately before the road is reopened, or can be repaired on a temporary basis, allowing the road to reopen with permanent repair being carried out during a quieter period. When the debris has been cleared ASC have the ultimate decision to reopen the highway.

11.3 EDF Energy's Role

11.3.1 EDF Energy has no direct role in the clearance of an incident; however, if a vehicle associated with their operation at the site breaks down on

the highway network their contractors will have measures in place to recover the vehicle. Once an incident has been cleared normal procedures relating to the daily management of HGV and bus movements to and from the construction site will apply and suppliers and bus drivers will be notified as appropriate that the incident has been cleared.

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
12. MONITORING

12.1 Introduction

12.1.1 The following section details EDF Energy’s responsibilities for monitoring HPC traffic within the IMA. This monitoring will be undertaken using the ANPR cameras installed along the approved HGV routes, which will be in place for the start of Phase 2 of the Site Preparation Works.

12.1.2 The provisional location of the ANPR cameras is set out in Figure 12.1 below.

Figure 12.1: Provisional ANPR Camera Locations



12.1.3 The locations of the ANPR cameras are as follows:

- Location 1 – A38 M5 Junction 23 Inbound and Outbound;
- Location 2 – A38 M5 Junction 24 Inbound and Outbound;
- Location 3 – A39 Broadway (Morrisons store) Inbound and Outbound;

- Location 4 – A39 Quantock Road (cemetery) Inbound and Outbound;
- Location 5 – A39 Main Road bypass Inbound and Outbound;
- Location 6 – The Drove Inbound and Outbound;
- Location 7 – Cannington bypass (location to be agreed prior to bypass);
- Location 8 – Homberg Way Inbound & Outbound;
- Location 9 – North of Cannington before Wick Park Covert (Wick Park Covert);
- A (FMF 1) – J23 FMF HGV Inbound;
- A (FMF 2) – J23 FMF HGV Outbound;
- B (FMF 5) – J24 FMF HGV Inbound;
- B (FMF 6) – J24 FMF HGV Outbound;
- C (CFLF 1) – Comwich Laydown Inbound;
- C (CFLF 2) – Comwich Laydown Outbound;
- D (Location HP 1) – HP Inbound;
- D (Location HP 2) – HP Outbound;
- D (Location HPC 1) – HPC Inbound; and
- E – Cannington bypass Construction Entrance North

12.1.4 With regards to Camera E, cameras will be installed at the north entrance of Cannington bypass (during construction) but the exact numbers and locations is subject to further detailed design discussions.

12.1.5 The scope of the DMS and ANPR systems is described within the DCO TMMS report appended to the DCO CTMP. These documents illustrate how the different parts of the system will be integrated, how the information flow between various parties will be facilitated and the lines of communication.

12.1.6 It should be noted that EDF Energy has no legal obligation or responsibility to monitor the occurrence or severity of incidents within the IMA. However, the ANPR cameras to be installed along the HGV routes may help on some occasions to identify such occurrences.

12.2 Current Arrangements

12.2.1 ASC currently record details of Personal Injury Incidents (PII) and damage-only incidents on the highway network as part of their existing responsibilities. It should be noted that if an incident results in what is described as a damage-only incident there is no legal obligation on the drivers or parties involved to report this to the Police (if certain details are exchanged between the parties involved) and therefore these incidents may not be recorded by ASC.

- 12.2.2 ASC has an existing process in place to share details of PII with SCC in order that the data can be monitored/analysed by SCC, or other interested parties.

12.3 EDF Energy's Role

- 12.3.1 As noted above, EDF Energy's role in the monitoring process will be to ensure HGV traffic associated with HPC adheres to the prescribed HGV routes. The ANPR system will provide monitoring of the prescribed HGV routes and will be introduced

for the start of the Phase 2 Site Preparation Works and continue through to the construction of HPC.

- 12.3.2 In addition, EDF Energy proposes to pass a raw feed of data (near real time) (anticipated delay to be measured in seconds) directly from the ANPR Installation to SCCs Common Database. The raw feed will contain all 'passage records' captured for all vehicles passing all public domain outstations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. A passage record is an individual vehicle record captured at each public domain outstation and contains the following data:

- Interpretation of Vehicle Registration Mark (VRM), including patch plate image.
- Date, time, camera location and confidence level.
- Data will be in CSV format. Example output would be date, time, location ID, VRM, confidence level e.g. 121011,075500,2,ABC123,100.

- 12.3.3 This data set will provide SCC with information on every vehicle passing every public domain ANPR outstation on the approved HGV routes between Junction 23 and Junction 24 of the M5 and HPC and Combwich. By feeding this information into their own UTM Common Database, SCC will be able to set the parameters and logic to provide them with the required analysis of the road network. SCC will then have full control over changes to the logic and parameters with which to analyse the road network and will not be reliant on EDF Energy to configure these within their own systems.

12.4 TIMP Meetings

- 12.4.1 It is proposed that EDF Energy, the emergency services and representatives from the SCC and the HA meet on a regular basis (frequency to be agreed between the stakeholders) in order to review the effectiveness of the protocols set out in the TIMP and make any necessary refinements.

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13. SCENARIO TESTING

13.1.1 In order to provide some clarity of how the DCO TIMP would be applied should an incident occur within the IMA, three potential incident scenarios have been identified.

13.1.2 These three scenarios were agreed between EDF Energy, the Emergency Services, SCC and the HE as part of the Site Preparation and Jetty Construction Works TIMP, which also outlined joint working practices which have been carried forward to this TIMP.

13.1.3 The three scenarios are as follows:

- Scenario 1 – Protest incident;
- Scenario 2 – A nuclear emergency; and
- Scenario 3 – Traffic congestion as a result of collision or other incident on a prescribed HGV route.

13.1.4 Appendix C contains further details of each scenario and each assessment.

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14. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

14.1 Summary

- 14.1.1 This DCO TIMP for the construction of HPC has been prepared to outline the processes for managing HPC Project related traffic during an event or incident that results in a loss of highway capacity on the two prescribed HGV routes to the site.
- 14.1.2 The production of this DCO TIMP has been based on a number of established procedures already in place with the local Highway Authority and Emergency Services, and good practice guidance predominantly produced by the HE, in conjunction with other key responders.
- 14.1.3 A TIMP is not a normal requirement of a planning application, and as such the production of the DCO TIMP demonstrates EDF Energy's commitment to constructively work with the highway authorities and emergency services to manage traffic incidents on the highway network.
- 14.1.4 It outlines the current roles and responsibilities of all the primary stakeholders i.e. the Emergency Services and Highway Authorities charged with responding to incidents, and provides a summary of how they currently respond to, manage and record incidents on the highway network, in order to return the road back to operating under normal conditions.
- 14.1.5 The objective of the DCO TIMP is to sets out what processes EDF Energy will have in place (and when they will be in place) either directly or indirectly in association with SCC to manage HPC HGVs and buses should an incident occur within the IMA, both in the short-term or over a longer-time frame whereby alternative diversionary routes may need to be used.
- 14.1.6 This document is intended to further develop the joint working practices between EDF Energy, SCC, the Local Planning Authorities, the Emergency Services and the HE to facilitate the mutual achievement of objectives in responding to and safely managing such an event/incident within the IMA. As such this DCO TIMP builds on the objectives, aims and principles of the agreed Site Preparation and Jetty Construction Works TIMP, which was prepared following consultation with SCC, the Emergency Services and the HE. In summary the following additional measures to those set out in the Site Preparation and Jetty Construction Works TIMP are proposed in the DCO TIMP:
- implementing a sophisticated web-based DMS which will enable information regarding a traffic incident to be disseminated to all

contractors and suppliers who are due to make a delivery on a given day;


- providing data to SCC for all vehicles passing every ANPR outstation on the approved HGV routes between Junctions 23 and 24 and the HPC site and Combwich for their own incident management needs;
- providing two FMF at Junctions 23 and 24 to enable HGVs to be held in the event of a traffic incident within the IMA until it is appropriate to release them; and
- the ability to hold buses at the park and ride facilities and accommodation campuses in the event of an incident within the IMA until it is appropriate to release them.
- The ability to vary hours and movements within overall vehicle caps in 'exceptional circumstances' and with environmental monitoring in place to ensure compliance within environmental limits.

14.2 Conclusion



- 14.2.1 In conclusion, this DCO TIMP has identified the current roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders involved in managing incidents on the highway network. It has looked to build on and enhance each of the key stakeholders understanding of how and by what measures EDF Energy will mitigate as far as is reasonably practical, its construction impacts during an incident in the IMA.


APPENDIX A - HGV PULL OVER LOCATIONS

Motorway Service Areas							
	Name	Road	Junction	Postcode	Tel. Number	HGV parking facilities	No. of available HGV parking spaces
1	Strensham	M5	J7-8	WR8 0BZ	01684 290577	yes	127
2	Michaelwood	M5	J13-14	GL11 6DD	01454 260631	yes	80
3	Gordano	M5	J19	BS20 7XG	01275 373624	yes	40
4	Sedgemoor	M5	J21-22	BS26 2UF	01934 750888	yes	40
5	Bridgwater	M5	J24	TA6 6TS	01278 456800	yes	-
6	Membury	M4	J14-15	RG17 7TZ	01488 674360	yes	90
7	Leigh Delamere	M4	J17-18	SN14 6LB	01666 837691/01666 842015	yes	-
8	Taunton Deane	M5	J25-26	TA3 7PF	01823 271111	yes	-
9	Cullompton	M5	J28	EX15	01494 678876	yes	20
10	Exeter	M5	J30	EX2 7HF	01392 436266	yes	-
11	Barton Stacey	A303	-	SO21 3NF	-	yes	-
12	Solstice Park	A303	-	SP4 7SQ	-	yes	-
13	Willoughby Hedge	A303	-	BA12 6AQ	-	yes	-
14	Podimore	A303, A37, A372	-	BA22 8JG	-	yes	-
15	Cartgate	A303	-	TA14 6RA	-	yes	-
16	Sourton Cross	A386	-	EX20 4LY	-	yes	-
17	Popham	A303	-	EX20	-	yes	-
18	Saltash	A386	-	PL12 6LF	-	yes	-
Lay Bys							
	Name	Road	Junction	Postcode	Tel. Number	HGV parking facilities	No. of available HGV parking spaces
19	Purition Hill Lay-by	A39	-	TA7 8AF	-	yes	-



Notes:
 1. This is not a construction drawing and is intended for illustrative purposes only.
 2. Where being is indicated only.




REV	DETAILS	DRAWN	CHECKED	DATE
CLIENT	EDF Energy			
PROJECT	Hinkley Point C			
DRAWING TITLE	Potential HGV Pull Over Locations			
SCALE	NTS at A3			
DRAWN	CR	CHECKED	TB	DATE 08.02.12
 transport planning specialists Helmont House, Churchill Way, Cardiff CF10 2HE t: 029 2072 0860 e: enquiries@vectos.co.uk				
DRAWING NUMBER	Figure 7.1			REVISION

APPENDIX B - DIVERSIONARY ROUTES


Alternative Route 1:

M5 Junction 23 – A39 Puriton Hill – A39 Bath Road – The Drove



Alternative Route 2:

A38 Bristol Road/A39 The Drove – A38 Monmouth Street – Broadway – North Street – Wembdon Road – Quantock Road – A38 Quantock Road/ A39 Homberg Way




Alternative Route 3:

**M5 Junction 24 – M5 Junction 23 – A38 Bristol Road – A39 Broadway - A38 Taunton Road/
A39 Broadway**




Alternative Route 4:

A38 Taunton Road – Broadway – Monmouth Street – Bristol Road – A39 The Drove – Western Way – Homberg Way - A39 Quantock Road



Alternative Route 5:

A38 Quantock Road – Homberg Way – Wembdon Rise – Wembdon Hill – Sandford Hill - A39 Quantock Road




Alternative Route 6 – Pre Cannington Bypass:

A39 Main Road – Brook Street – Fore Street – C182 Rodway



Alternative Route 7 – Post Cannington Bypass:

A39 Cannington Southern Bypass – High Street – C182 Rodway



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APPENDIX C - SCENARIOS

Scenario	Control Measures
<p>1) Protest Incident at HPC site or park and ride/freight management facility – In the event that the access route to HPC or one of the park and ride or freight management facilities is blocked by a protest, there will be a requirement to restrict or stop site related traffic from approaching the area.</p>	<p>Control of site traffic en-route to the particular site stopped/redirected and vehicles turned around. Required to keep approaches to the particular site clear for deployment of Emergency Services/evacuation of residents.</p> <p>Proposed Mitigation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HPC Traffic Control arranges for all vehicles to be stopped from entering “Incident Management Area”. • Vehicles inside immediate incident area are moved to a “place of safety” away from routes to incident area. • Suppliers are contacted to cancel/postpone deliveries. • Control of HPC HGVs and buses is instigated.
<p>2) Nuclear Emergency In the event of a nuclear emergency at HPA or HPB Sites there will be a requirement for all site traffic (and vehicle occupants) to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Take emergency countermeasures for their own protection. <p>Remove all site bound traffic from the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) and ensure that such traffic does not impede the deployment of emergency responders or adversely affect the implementation of countermeasures to protect the public within the DEPZ.</p>	<p>Control of site traffic en-route to HPC will be stopped/redirected and vehicles turned round. Required to keep approaches to HPC clear for deployment of Emergency Services/evacuation of residents.</p> <p>Proposed Mitigation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HPC Traffic Control arranges for all vehicles to be stopped from entering “Incident Management Area”. • Vehicles inside the DEPZ are moved to a “place of safety away from routes to HPC. • Suppliers are contacted to cancel/postpone deliveries. • Control of HPC HGVs and buses is instigated.
<p>3) Traffic Incident within the DCO TIMP Incident Management Area.</p>	<p>Proposed Mitigation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EDF Energy to implement the measures set out in the TIMP

